The formation of a new armed alliance seeking to oust Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed follows a pattern that has plagued Ethiopia – an empire of many nations and nationalities still in formation – for decades. Those in power leave little room for peaceful political struggle; The winner takes all, so those who feel disadvantaged take up arms to change the status quo. Actors and alliances change over time, but violence remains the only constant. Civil war in parts of Oromia has raged since Abiy took power in 2018, while conflict in the Amhara region has raged since 2023. In Tigray, the Pretoria agreement was never fully implemented. Although full-scale war had not resumed, the region had been under siege since a faction of the TPLF seized power and intensified its confrontation with the federal government. Until the latest escalation, Abiy’s government had largely been content to control the center of power while confronting the rebels with drones and ground forces. The government held national elections even though no voting took place in Tigray and several other districts. He formed the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission in 2021, which concluded a national conference of some 4,000 participants in August, despite the absence of armed groups and other key opposition organizations. At the same time, the government has continued to carry out major development projects. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was in Djibouti on September 24 for the launch of the Ethiopia-Djibouti oil infrastructure project. The newly elected parliament will be inaugurated on October 5, when a new federal government will be formed. The Ethiopian Popular Forces Alliance for Survival, announced on September 20, was not a surprise. This followed several months of coordination meetings between the groups, held in the presence of military and security representatives from Eritrea and Sudan. It brings together the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and four movements from the regions of Somali, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz. Despite OLA’s involvement, Oromo organizations and elites are divided in their support for the alliance. The alliance aims to oust Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and establish an inclusive transition. Three of the seven organizations – the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement and the Afar National Unity Revolutionary Front (ANURF) – are of particular strategic importance. All three are located in northern Ethiopia, which borders Eritrea, allowing for continued logistical support from there. Three days later, TPLF forces, allied with ANURF, advanced into several districts of Zone 2 with little resistance. ANURF is led by Ibrahim Osman Aliyu, known as Haji Ibrahim, a respected figure from Berhale in Zone 2 and a relative of Ethiopian Defense Minister Aisha Mohammed. He defected to Eritrea last year with a contingent of Afar Special Forces and local forces. In a message to the Afar people, he assured them that the current fighting was directed against the Prosperity Party, not the Afar people or fighter groups, and that services and public transportation would continue unhindered. He advised Afar residents to join forces or stay away from the fighting. Their next objective may be the vital highway linking Ethiopia with Djibouti. We’ve seen some of this story before, although this time the alliance took longer to form. In November 2021, nine opposition groups hastily announced the United Front of Federalist and Confederalist Forces of Ethiopia. Tigray and OLA forces advanced toward Addis Ababa, as alliance leaders talked about dismantling Abiy’s government and installing a transitional authority. By January 2022, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front had abandoned the united front, accusing the TPLF of killing Afar civilians. In December of the same year, the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement signed a peace agreement with the regional government. The federal army counterattacked, Tigray forces withdrew from neighboring regions, and the TPLF finally signed the 2022 Pretoria agreement with the government. That pact required the TPLF to stop supporting armed groups in other parts of Ethiopia. The same pattern could repeat itself. The lesson is not that 2026 will be an exact reflection of 2021. The new alliance includes Fano, whose fighters supported the federal government against the TPLF during the previous war and are now fighting Abiy. The government is also fighting on several fronts. But precedent shows how quickly a common enemy can cease to be enough when fortunes change on the battlefield. Both Fano and the TPLF claim western Tigray, or what the Amhara call Wolgait-Tsegede. The founding declaration does not offer any agreement. A Tigrayan leadership that abandons its claim risks alienating displaced people from their homes; a Fano leadership that admits this risks losing the support of the combatants for whom territory is central. Letting the issue be a topic for later negotiations buys time but does not create a compromise. The same problem extends beyond the north: the Oromo, Amhara and Somali movements do not share a vision of Ethiopia’s federal order, borders or distribution of power. Nor does each organization speak for all members of the population it claims to represent. Tigray leaders are divided over their relationship with Addis Ababa and the Pretoria agreement. Fano is a collection of regional commands with different priorities. Even the involvement of the Ogaden National Liberation Front has exposed an internal dispute: a foreign faction supports the alliance, while leaders within Ethiopia’s Somali region deny joining it. A seven-signature declaration cannot resolve these mandate issues. Then there is the military problem. These forces operate in distant regions and can put pressure on the federal military, forcing Addis Ababa to defend multiple theaters. But simultaneous combats are not the same as a single campaign. A successful march towards the capital would require reliable supply routes, coordinated command and political support in the areas through which the fighters must pass. Government drones make concentrated formations and exposed supply lines more vulnerable. Air power alone cannot rule contested cities, but neither can an alliance rule them simply by capturing them. Eritrea adds another risk. Addis Ababa accuses Asmara of backing alliance; Eritrea has repeatedly denied similar allegations, although abundant evidence suggests otherwise. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply amid Ethiopia’s calls for access to the Red Sea and disputes left unresolved after the Tigray war. External support could strengthen individual factions, but dependence on Eritrea could also make them unacceptable to other Ethiopians. If the Ethiopian government comes to see Eritrea as a direct threat, it may attack, with unpredictable consequences and the risk of attracting other regional powers. If Abiy’s own government is seriously threatened, the UAE could become fully involved to rescue one of its closest regional allies. Three paths now seem possible. What is most likely is a protracted and unequal conflict: local offensives and temporary agreements weaken the government’s reach without dislodging it from Addis Ababa. The second is the fragmentation of alliances. If western Tigray, Afar or other disputed territory becomes the price of cooperation, some partners may leave or make separate deals. A renegotiation of the Pretoria deal and concessions from Abiy to Tigray could also pull the TPLF out of the alliance, as happened with the front’s 2021 ambitions. A less likely but much more dangerous possibility is a cascade of federal military defections and coordinated rebel advances. Even then, a rebel takeover would constitute an unconstitutional change of government under African Union rules and face regional opposition. Removing Abiy would not resolve any of the arguments over land, rule and constitutional power. Victory could start another civil war. Ethiopia has repeatedly seen coalitions of convenience promise a new beginning through force. What matters now is not whether an armed alliance or a government survives, but what happens to the people who will have to live with what both do next. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.
